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ABSTRACT 
This Note begins with commentary on the United States’ former 
worldwide system of taxation. This system taxed multinational 
corporations’ offshore profits at the applicable domestic income tax rate 
less credits for taxes paid to foreign governments. This tax regime 
provided for the deferral of income tax due on the profits of multinational 
corporations’ overseas operations until the time of repatriation. This Note 
considers the issues inherent in this system and analyzes the repatriation 
tax holiday under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. This holiday 
has been unanimously criticized by both sides of the political aisle and led 
to large multinational corporations stockpiling offshore profits at an even 
higher rate, likely in anticipation of more favorable legislation. This Note 
then contends that subsequent legislation aimed at altering the repatriation 
tax was viewed warily by members of Congress, who were cognizant of 
the holiday’s many failures. This Note concludes with an analysis of the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which replaced the United States’ former 
worldwide taxation system with a territorial taxation system. This new 
system, which does not tax multinational corporations’ foreign profits, 
rightly worries many commentators. However, anti-base erosion 
measures, a lower corporate income tax rate, and an influx of foreign-held 
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INTRODUCTION 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are not a modern phenomenon. 
In the seventeenth century, firms such as the East India Company 
spearheaded intercontinental economic expansions, creating 
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unprecedented wealth in their home countries.1 The structure of what 
would become modern MNCs became even more apparent with the 
emergence of the nineteenth century industrial capitalist system.2 Since 
then, technology, deregulation, and market liberalization have continued 
to advance the global economic structure in which MNCs prosper.3 
Over time, MNCs have grown dramatically in number and power. At 
the beginning of the Second World War there were an estimated seven 
thousand MNCs; by the end of the twentieth century, an estimated sixty-
three thousand.4 Today, MNCs account for roughly 80% of global trade.5 
This increase in the number and power of MNCs has resulted in novel 
issues; one unresolved issue contemplates how an MNC’s domestic 
jurisdiction should tax foreign-sourced income. 
The United States has subjected MNCs domiciled within its borders 
to a tax on income “from whatever source derived.”6 Accordingly, the 
United States assessed a tax on MNCs’ foreign-sourced income just as it 
did on their domestic income. This system of taxation is referred to as a 
“worldwide” system of taxation, which is not the norm elsewhere; less 
than ten countries employ some form of this system.7 In conjunction with 
this worldwide system, the U.S. tax regime provided for the indefinite 
deferral of the income tax on MNCs’ offshore income until it was 
repatriated—commonly referred to as Subpart F deferral.8 
MNCs have stockpiled cash offshore because the tax on foreign-
sourced income can be deferred until the time of repatriation.9 The 
Subpart F deferral regime has allowed large companies that do not require 
immediate domestic access to their offshore earnings (Google, Pfizer, etc.) 
                                                     
 1. See generally NICK ROBINS, THE CORPORATION THAT CHANGED THE WORLD: HOW THE EAST 
INDIA COMPANY SHAPED THE MODERN MULTINATIONAL (2012). 
 2. See Bruce Mazlish, Three Factors of Globalization: Multinational Corporations, Non-
Governmental Organizations, and Global Consciousness, GLOBALITY STUD. J. (Mar. 1, 2012), 
https://gsj.stonybrook.edu/view/three-factors-of-globalization-multinational-corporations-non-
governmental-organizations-and-global-consciousness/ [https://perma.cc/3MT4-R42A]. 
 3. John Stopford, Multinational Corporations, FOREIGN POL’Y, Winter 1998–1999, at 12, 12 
(“Recent advances in information technology, coupled with deregulation and market liberalization 
worldwide, have fueled an unprecedented surge in the growth of [MNCs].”). 
 4. Mazlish, supra note 2. 
 5. See Press Release, United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., 80% of Trade Takes Place 
in “Value Chains” Linked to Transnational Corporations, UNCTAD Report Says (Feb. 27, 2013), 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PressRelease.aspx?OriginalVersionID=113 [https://perma.cc/6R53-
K2A9]. 
 6. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012) (defining gross income). 
 7. Kyle Pomerleau, Worldwide Taxation is Very Rare, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 5, 2015), https:// 
taxfoundation.org/worldwide-taxation-very-rare/ [https://perma.cc/LHQ4-4KQC]. 
 8. See I.R.C §§ 951–965 (Subpart F). 
 9. See Lynnley Browning, IRS Issues Tax Rate Guidance for Stockpiled Foreign Income, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-29/irs-issues-
guidance-on-tax-rates-for-stockpiled-foreign-income [https://perma.cc/NR5K-3GZK]. 
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to keep large sums of money in low-tax jurisdictions and delay 
repatriation.10 This strategy not only stymies MNCs’ domestic cash 
holdings but also costs the United States up to $111 billion each year.11 
That is roughly a third of the $320.7 billion the United States collected 
from corporate income taxes during fiscal year 2014.12 
The billions in revenue gained through assessment of tax on foreign-
held corporate dollars would be a welcome addition to our constrained 
federal budget. For example, the federal education budget may not have 
suffered a 13% decrease in funding in 2018 if the government had access 
to this revenue.13 Further, the MNCs themselves could use repatriated cash 
domestically for many positive ends, such as job creation, investments, 
and shareholder dividends. Both public and private sectors benefit when 
MNCs repatriate; consequently, repatriation avoidance became an issue in 
need of a legislative solution. 
A change to the repatriation tax scheme was inevitable. This Note 
explores how and why the worldwide system was replaced with a 
territorial system of taxation, wherein foreign sourced income is offset by 
a deduction of equal amount.14 
For decades, both sides of the political aisle have attempted to bring 
the trillions of dollars MNCs held offshore back home by restructuring the 
repatriation tax. However, until the passing of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 
legislative efforts to entice MNCs to repatriate have been largely 
unsuccessful. Congress has attempted other short-term answers; the results 
of which have been, in effect, to reward MNCs that avoided the 
repatriation tax. 
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of the former worldwide 
system, including how the repatriation tax operated and the results of 
MNCs’ avoidance and evasion. Part II of this Note will discuss the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, legislation that included a short-term 
repatriation tax holiday. Additionally, this section will provide a general 
overview of the holiday, the rationale behind its enactment, and how it 
failed to meet its goals, thereby affecting future attempts at repatriation 
                                                     
 10. See Jesse Drucker, How Tax Bills Would Reward Companies That Moved Money Offshore, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/business/taxes-offshore-
repatriation.html. 
 11. Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base in the United 
States and Beyond, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 905, 930 (2016). 
 12. Media Briefing, Oxfam Am., Broken at the Top: How America’s Dysfunctional Tax System 
Costs Billions in Corporate Tax Dodging 9 (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/ 
media/files/Broken_at_the_Top_4.14.2016.pdf. 
 13. DEP’T OF EDUC., PRESIDENT TRUMP’S FY 2018 BUDGET 1, https://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
overview/budget/budget18/budget-factsheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2018) (the estimated yearly 
revenue from repatriation is nearly twice the federal education budget). 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
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legislation. Part III of this Note will explore selected repatriation tax 
proposals since the 2004 holiday: the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Partnership to Build America Act, and the 
border adjustment tax proposal. This Note will provide an analysis about 
what these proposals aimed to do and why they failed. Part IV will look 
prospectively at the new territorial tax system by analyzing how the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act operates and critiquing the consequences of its 
implementation. This Note concludes that negative effects of this 
transition may be quelled by anti-base erosion measures, a lower corporate 
income tax rate, and an influx of foreign-held cash. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE WORLDWIDE SYSTEM’S REPATRIATION TAX 
Before the territorial system, the United States was unique in that it 
taxed income earned outside of its borders by MNCs domiciled within.15 
Importantly, MNCs could defer the income tax indefinitely per the deferral 
rules in Subpart F.16 This repatriation tax subjected MNCs’ foreign-
sourced income to the same rate as their domestic income, which was one 
of the highest corporate income tax rates in the industrialized world at 
35%.17 
These three former features of the U.S. tax system—a relatively high 
statutory rate applied worldwide, intricate deferral rules in Subpart F, and 
an eventual tax on repatriated earnings—help illuminate why Fortune 500 
companies stockpiled an estimated $2.6 trillion offshore.18 Studies show 
that the magnitude of the cash held abroad is a consequence of tax costs 
associated with repatriating foreign income.19 
A. The Repatriation Tax Treatment 
MNCs’ foreign subsidiaries were still subject to income taxation in 
the jurisdiction where they were domiciled.20 Therefore, foreign 
subsidiaries’ earnings were subject to double taxation: the applicable tax 
in both the foreign jurisdiction where they were domiciled and the U.S. 
                                                     
 15. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012); JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RES. SERV., R42624, MOVING TO A 
TERRITORIAL INCOME TAX: OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES 2–6 (2012). 
 16. See I.R.C. § 951(a). 
 17. DELOITTE, CORPORATE TAX RATES 2017 (2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/ 
Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-corporate-tax-rates.pdf (this statutory rate does not reflect 
bracket, marginal, or effective rates, which are beyond the scope of this Note). 
 18. Fortune 500 Companies Hold a Record $2.6 Trillion Offshore, INST. TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y 
(Mar. 28, 2017), https://itep.org/fortune-500-companies-hold-a-record-26-trillion-offshore/. 
 19. C. Fritz Foley et al., Why Do Firms Hold So Much Cash? A Tax-Based Explanation, 86 J. 
FIN. ECON. 579, 579 (2007) (“[F]irms facing higher repatriation taxes hold higher levels of cash, hold 
this cash abroad, and hold this cash in affiliates that trigger high tax costs when repatriating 
earnings.”). 
 20. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012). 
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corporate income tax. To offset this burden, the United States used a tax-
credit system.21 In this system, an MNC’s domestic and foreign income 
were taxed at the same rate; however, the rate applied to foreign income 
was offset by tax credits received for taxes paid to foreign governments.22 
Tax credits were not given for all taxes paid to foreign governments; they 
were only given for the foreign tax paid on the money being repatriated.23 
These tax credits could only be used on an MNC’s tax obligations arising 
from the repatriation of foreign profits; they could not be used for domestic 
obligations.24 Thus, the tax-credit system prevented MNCs’ foreign 
subsidiaries from being subjected to double taxation. 
The worldwide system allowed for the deferral of domestic tax 
obligations on foreign income until the time of repatriation.25 Deferral was 
generally available on income produced in a foreign country by controlled-
foreign-corporations (CFCs).26 If a foreign affiliate firm was simply a 
branch of an MNC incorporated in the United States (i.e., not separately 
incorporated in the foreign jurisdiction) its profits were taxed immediately 
at the U.S. rate less applicable tax credits.27 An MNC’s opportunities to 
defer the tax on foreign income from their CFCs were limited by Subpart F 
of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.).28 Under Subpart F, types of passive 
foreign income, such as interest and dividends, were exempt from deferral 
and taxed immediately.29 
A simple example of how an MNC would use the credit system can 
be illustrated by considering a U.S. corporation earning money in Ireland, 
the world’s sixth “worst” tax haven according to OxFam International.30 
For the purposes of this example, the MNC is subject to a U.S. corporate 
income tax rate of 35%, Ireland has a corporate income tax rate of 12.5%, 
and the exchange rate between the two countries is 1:1. The U.S. MNC 
has an affiliate firm incorporated in Ireland that has earned $800,000. 
                                                     
 21. See Id. § 960; GRAVELLE, supra note 15, at 4. 
 22. GRAVELLE, supra note 15, at 4. 
 23. See Foley et al., supra note 19, at 582–83. 
 24. Id. at 583. 
 25. Id. at 582. 
 26. Id. A corporation is considered a CFC when it is incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction and 
when either 50% of its voting power or 50% of the total value of its stock are owned by U.S. 
shareholders. See I.R.C. § 957(a) (2012). 
 27. Foley et al., supra note 19, at 582. 
 28. See I.R.C. §§ 951–965 (Subpart F). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY OFFICE OF TAX 
POLICY, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN 
CORPORATIONS (2000), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-
SubpartF-2000.pdf. 
 29. Foley et al., supra note 19, at 582. 
 30. OXFAM, TAX BATTLES: THE DANGEROUS GLOBAL RACE TO THE BOTTOM ON CORPORATE 
TAX 3 (2016), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp-race-to-bottom-corporate-tax-
121216-en.pdf. 
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The Irish affiliate defers U.S. tax liability on this money per 
Subpart F. The Irish firm must first pay $100,000 in taxes to the Irish 
government (12.5% of $800,000). It then repatriates $70,000 to the U.S. 
firm, triggering the repatriation tax. The Irish affiliate is eligible for a tax 
credit of $100,000 multiplied by the ratio of dividends to after-tax profits 
(70,000/700,000). Therefore, there are $10,000 in tax credits to offset the 
$24,500 repatriation tax. The MNC can get the $70,000 to the U.S. by 
paying $14,500 more in U.S. repatriation taxes—a net increase of $55,500 
in domestically accessible capital. 
The remaining foreign income, $630,000 ($800,000 less $100,000 in 
Irish taxes and $70,000 repatriated), can be invested and grow tax-free so 
long as it remains overseas. 31 If the MNC is not in need of liquid assets 
for use in its home country, the best business decision would be to allow 
that money to grow abroad until it is advantageous to repatriate (e.g., a tax 
holiday is enacted).32 
B. The Result of Multinational Corporations Avoiding Repatriation 
In 2017, there was an estimated $2.6 trillion being held offshore by 
U.S. MNCs that wished to avoid the repatriation tax.33 That is only one 
troubling number. Roughly $77 billion to $111 billion in tax revenue was 
lost annually from such profit-shifting.34 This revenue could have been 
instrumental in strengthening infrastructure, improving education, or 
providing healthcare. 
Of course, when foreign income is held offshore, MNCs cannot 
invest it domestically. The effect repatriating $2.6 trillion would have on 
the U.S. economy is substantial; for reference, that amount is roughly 
equal to the gross market capitalization of France.35 
Other problematic results from MNCs avoiding the repatriation tax 
were subtler. For example, one may assume that an MNC holding billions 
of dollars in cash or assets offshore could not benefit from it. This is not 
                                                     
 31. This example is heavily drawn from Kimberly A. Clausing & Kevin A. Hassett, The Role of 
U.S. Tax Policy in Offshoring, in BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM: 2005: OFFSHORING WHITE-COLLAR 
WORK 457, 458–59 (Susan M. Collins & Lael Brainard eds., 2006). 
 32. As will be discussed later in this Note, MNCs can and do tap into these profits to meet their 
domestic cash flow needs through complex financing transactions and other intricate arrangements. 
Corporate finance is rarely so simple as transferring large sums of cash to meet cash flow demands. 
There are other ways MNCs can access value and deploy it around the world without ever actually 
transferring the cash itself. The IRS has closed some of these loopholes, but many are still available. 
 33. INST. TAX’N AND ECON. POL’Y, supra note 18. 
 34. Clausing, supra note 11, at 906. 
 35. See Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (Current US$), WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?locations=FR&year_high_desc= 
true [https://perma.cc/3H7M-WT5Y] (showing France’s gross domestic capital was roughly $2.2 
trillion in 2016). 
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true. MNCs used offshore cash and assets as collateral to borrow money 
domestically, thus freeing up untaxed foreign capital for use in the United 
States.36 An MNC could also simply choose to reinvest foreign capital into 
a foreign state’s economy. This would result in a complete loss of potential 
domestic tax revenue and the inability of the MNC to use that money 
domestically. 
C. Inversions and Earnings Stripping 
A common form of repatriation tax avoidance was a corporate 
inversion.37 The United States Department of the Treasury defines a 
corporate inversion: 
[A] transaction in which a U.S.-parented multinational group changes 
its tax residence to reduce or avoid paying U.S. taxes. More 
specifically, a U.S.-parented group engages in an inversion when it 
acquires a smaller foreign company and then locates the tax residence 
of the merged group outside the U.S., typically in a low-tax country.38 
Frequently, the effect of a corporate inversion on the business of an 
MNC is minimal—rarely do operations relocate.39 The Department of the 
Treasury has issued regulations that make these inversions expensive and 
difficult,40 yet corporate inversions continue.41 Tightening the rules on 
corporate inversions did not fix the reasons why MNCs left the United 
States: the corporate income tax rate and the repatriation tax.42 
After an inversion, MNCs frequently engage in “earnings 
stripping.”43 In this scheme, an MNC that is based in a foreign country will 
loan large amounts of money between its U.S. subsidiaries after a 
corporate inversion.44 The debt from these loans is then issued to the U.S. 
                                                     
 36. Oxfam Am., supra note 12, at 3. 
 37. MICHELLE CLARK NEELY & LARRY D. SHERRER, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, A LOOK AT 
CORPORATE INVERSIONS, INSIDE AND OUT (2017), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-
economist/first_quarter_2017/a-look-at-corporate-inversions-inside-and-out [https://perma.cc/2SPZ-
J758]. 
 38. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Issues Inversion Regulations 
and Proposed Earnings Stripping Regulations (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ 
press-releases/Pages/jl0404.aspx [https://perma.cc/W24X-YQ3D]. 
 39. NEELY & SHERRER, supra note 37.  
 40. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7874 (2012) (imposing a tax on the inversion gain of expatriated entities). 
 41. See NEELY & SHERRER, supra note 37; U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 38. 
 42. How to Stop the Inversion Perversion, THE ECONOMIST (July 26, 2014), 
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21608751-restricting-companies-moving-abroad-no-
substitute-corporate-tax-reform-how-stop [https://perma.cc/D5HN-TZZ4]. 
 43. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Ariel Assa, Rules Against Earnings Stripping: Wrong Answer to 
Corporate Inversions, INT’L ECON. POL’Y BRIEFS, May 2003, at 1, 8. https://piie.com/sites/ 
default/files/publications/pb/pb03-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/4939-VHZM]. 
 44. Id. 
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subsidiary’s low-tax foreign parent company.45 The subsidiary then 
deducts the resulting interest expense on its U.S. income tax return from 
its overall earnings.46 Earnings stripping continued despite attempts to 
curb the practice.47 
In 2017, the U.S. Public Interest Research Group Education Fund 
released a report detailing the massive amount of offshore tax loopholes 
and exceptions attorneys and accountants have taken advantage of, mostly 
for Fortune 500 companies.48 This report found that “[a]t least 366 
companies, or 73% of the Fortune 500, operate one or more subsidiaries 
in tax haven countries.”49 Of these companies, just thirty hold $1.76 trillion 
offshore—68% of the total dollar amount.50 Those thirty companies 
collectively operate 2,213 tax haven subsidiaries.51 
These numbers beg important questions: Why does the United States 
continue to allow wealthy Fortune 500 companies to get a pass on their 
duly owed repatriation taxes, while smaller MNCs pay their fair share? 
Why are large MNCs who ship assets (and typically at least some jobs) 
offshore and out of the U.S. economy rewarded, while corporations who 
remain domestic are forced to shoulder a larger share of our federal tax 
revenue burden? 
II. THE AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004 
Congressman William Thomas (R-CA-22), Chairman of the House 
Ways and Means Committee, introduced The American Jobs Creation Act 
of 2004 (AJCA), which President George W. Bush signed into law on 
October 22, 2004.52 
At its inception, the AJCA was to be an economic bill that would 
repeal the United States’ extraterritorial income exclusion, which was 
found to have violated the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) policies on 
                                                     
 45. Id. 
 46. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 38. 
 47. See I.R.C. § 163(j) (2012) (limiting deductions when a corporation’s debt to equity ratio 
exceeds 1.5). 
 48. U.S. PUB. INT. GROUP EDUC. FUND & INST. ON TAX’N AND ECON. POL’Y, OFFSHORE SHELL 
GAMES 2017: THE USE OF OFFSHORE TAX HAVENS BY FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES 1 (Oct. 17, 2017). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 12 (The thirty companies are, in descending order by amount held offshore, Apple, 
Pfizer, Microsoft, General Electric, International Business Machines, Johnson & Johnson, Cisco 
Systems, Merck, Google, Exxon Mobil, Procter & Gamble, Oracle, Citigroup, Chevron, Intel, 
PepsiCo, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Gilead Sciences, Amgen, Coca-Cola, Qualcomm, Goldman Sachs, 
United Technologies, AbbVie Inc., Eli Lilly, Wal-Mart Stores, Hewlett Packard Enterprises, Bristol-
Myers Squibb, Abbott Laboratories, and Danaher.). 
 51. Id. at 1. 
 52. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418–1660 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
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export subsidies.53 The extraterritorial income exclusion had been a 
response to the 1999 WTO finding that the United States’ foreign sales 
corporation regime violated two WTO agreements.54 
The 108th Congress, with Republicans holding 51 seats in the 
Senate55 and 229 in the House of Representatives,56 added section 422 of 
the AJCA (later codified as I.R.C. § 965),57 sometimes referred to as the 
Homeland Investment Act (HIA). The HIA allowed domestic MNCs to 
claim an 85% dividends-received deduction on certain cash dividends 
from their foreign subsidiaries for one year.58 So spawned the 2004 
repatriation tax holiday, wherein repatriation of foreign income by U.S. 
MNCs rose from about $62 billion per year in 2004, taxed at 35%, to $299 
billion in 2005 with an effective repatriation tax rate of 5.25%.59 
A. The Rationale of the Homeland Investment Act 
Politicians were already cognizant of the effect repatriation taxes 
were having on MNCs’ tax avoidance when the AJCA was passed. The 
legislative purpose of the HIA was clear: increase investments in the U.S. 
economy and in research and development (R&D) and create domestic 
jobs by incentivizing MNCs to repatriate foreign income held offshore.60 
Many members of Congress, both Republican and Democrat, voiced 
strong support of the HIA as a measure that would boost the U.S. 
economy.61 Congressman Phil English (R-PA-3) articulated the rationale 
quite well: 
                                                     
 53. IVINS, PHILLIPS & BARKER, THE AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004: AN ANALYSIS OF 
SELECTED PROVISIONS 1, http://www.ipbtax.com/media/publication/39_IPB% 
20AJCA%20Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/QXG2-LNP7]. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma. 
cc/2B4N-2LUA]. 
 56. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http:// 
history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ [https://perma.cc/69KC-MPFB]. 
 57. See I.R.C. § 965 (2012). 
 58. Id.; IVINS, PHILLIPS & BARKER, supra note 53, at 7. 
 59. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG., REPATRIATING OFFSHORE FUNDS: 2004 TAX WINDFALL 
FOR SELECT MULTINATIONALS 1 (Comm. Print 2012) [hereinafter PSI REPORT] (an 85% deduction to 
the corporate income tax rate was 5.25%); Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Watch What I Do, Not What 
I Say: The Unintended Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act, 66 J. FIN. 753, 753–54 (2011). 
 60. See PSI REPORT, supra note 59. 
 61. See, e.g., 150 Cong. Rec. H8724 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Mark Udall, 
Democrat) (“I will vote for it because it includes provisions to encourage American corporations doing 
business abroad to repatriate their overseas earnings for investment here at home. This has great 
potential to stimulate investment in new plant and equipment as well as in the research and 
development that support innovation, job creation, and prosperity.”); 150 Cong. Rec. S11038 (daily 
ed. Oct. 7, 2010) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Republican) (“This bill contains some of the 
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I particularly want to draw attention to one particular job-creating 
provision in this bill . . . [t]his provision, known as the Homeland 
Investment Act, is one of the strongest stimulus proposals brought 
before Congress in recent years, and I think it is going to have a huge 
impact. It temporarily reduces the tax rate on foreign earnings of U.S. 
companies, when that money is brought back to the United States for 
investment here at home. The billions of dollars that will be brought 
back will be used by American employers to hire new workers, invest 
in top-of-the-line equipment, and build new plants right here at home, 
instead of in the countries where their earnings are currently 
stranded.62 
The support for a legislative repatriation holiday to stimulate the U.S. 
economy through the introduction of foreign-held corporate capital into 
the domestic economy was not based solely on wishful thinking. The HIA 
included the subsection “Requirement to Invest in United States.”63 This 
provision required that an MNC taking advantage of the 2004 holiday 
internally64 approve of a “domestic reinvestment plan” in which the 
repatriated money would be used for “worker hiring and training, 
infrastructure, research and development, capital investments, or the 
financial stabilization of the corporation for the purposes of job retention 
or creation.”65 
Further, the repatriated dividends were required to be in cash66 and 
were limited to “extraordinary” dividends, defined as the excess of 
repatriations over the average amount of repatriations during the previous 
five years, excluding the highest and lowest years.67 Thus, MNCs that had 
been stockpiling money abroad, with low average amounts of repatriation, 
would benefit from the HIA more than MNCs that had steadily repatriated 
in the past.68 Therefore, the legislative intent behind the HIA was not to 
give all MNCs a tax break to surge repatriation generally. Rather, the HIA 
was included within the AJCA merely to bring back some of the capital 
that was being stockpiled overseas. 
                                                     
most important international tax reforms in decades, bringing foreign earnings home for investment 
in the United States instead of investing overseas, hence creating jobs in the United States.”). 
 62. 150 Cong. Rec. H8704 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2004) (Statement of Rep. Phil English, Republican). 
 63. I.R.C. § 965(b)(4) (2012). 
 64. Id. § 965(b)(4)(A) (The domestic reinvestment plan was to be approved by “the [MNC’s] 
president, chief executive officer, or comparable official.”). 
 65. Id. § 965(b)(4)(B). 
 66. Id. § 965(a)(1). 
 67. See Id. § 965(b)(2); Jennifer Blouin & Linda Krull, Bringing It Home: A Study of the 
Incentives Surrounding the Repatriation of Foreign Earnings Under the American Jobs Creation Act 
of 2004, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 1027, 1031–32 (2009). 
 68. See Blouin & Krull, supra note 67, at 1032. 
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The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) promptly followed the passing 
of the AJCA by releasing Notice 2005-10 on February 7, 2005.69 This 
guidance generally detailed the parameters and procedures of a domestic 
reinvestment plan.70 The IRS prohibited the plans from including 
executive compensation,71 dividends and other distributions with respect 
to stock,72 stock redemptions,73 and tax payments.74 As will be discussed 
below, the fungible nature of cash made these IRS limitations nearly 
unenforceable. 
A subsequent empirical study has shown that ninety-three MNCs, 
individually or working as a coalition, spent a total of $282.7 million on 
lobbying for the AJCA.75 This lobbying was a good investment: MNCs 
received a 22,000% return in tax breaks received as a result of the AJCA.76 
A further study reigns in those numbers: 
$1 million in lobbying expenditures is associated with about $32.35 
million in taxes saved, an increase in $100,000 of Political Action 
Committee contributions is associated with about $15.64 million in 
taxes saved, and that the additional filing of ten tax-related lobbying 
reports is associated with about $21.08 million in taxes saved.77  
Notwithstanding the difference between these two studies, MNCs heavily 
invested in political lobbying for the AJCA because the amount to be 
saved in taxes offset (and greatly exceeded) their initial political 
expenditures. 
B. The Results and Criticisms of the Homeland Investment Act 
The negative results of the repatriation tax holiday began pouring in 
after it ran its course. MNCs had repatriated roughly $300 billion of 
foreign earnings during the holiday.78 However, instead of creating jobs, 
                                                     
 69. I.R.S. Notice 2005-10, 2005-6 I.R.B. (Feb. 7, 2005), https://www.irs.gov/irb/2005-06_IRB 
[https://perma.cc/UQB4-7YZP]. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. § 6.02. 
 72. Id. § 6.04. 
 73. Id. § 6.05. 
 74. Id. § 6.08. 
 75. Raquel Alexander et al., Measuring Rates of Return on Lobbying Expenditures: An Empirical 
Case Study of Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations, 25 J. L. & POL. 401, 404 (2009). 
 76. Id. (“[C]orporations that lobbied for the tax benefit spent $282.7 million on lobbying 
expenditures and received $62.5 billion in tax savings, resulting in an average return in excess of $220 
for every $1 spent on lobbying, or 22,000 percent.”). 
 77. Hui Chen et al., Return on Political Investment in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
32 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Accounting & Mgmt. Unit, Working Paper No.15-050, 2014). 
 78. See, e.g., PSI REPORT, supra note 59, at 1 (“[C]orporations returned $312 billion in qualified 
repatriation dollars to the United States . . . .”); Melissa Redmiles, The One-Time Received Dividend 
Deduction, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. STAT. INCOME BULL., Spring 2008, at 102, 103 
(“[C]orporations repatriated almost $362 billion. Of that, $312 billion qualified for the deduction, 
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funding R&D, and increasing domestic investments, “estimates imply that 
every extra dollar of repatriated cash was associated with an increase of 
$0.60 to $0.92 in payouts to shareholders, largely in the form of share 
repurchases.”79 Not only does this display a sharp contrast between the 
intended effects of the HIA and its actual result, it raises an important 
question: how were MNCs able to use dividends repatriated during the 
2004 holiday in ways the IRS guidance explicitly disallowed?80 The 
answer is surprisingly simple: the fungibility of cash.81 Critics argue that 
MNCs could simply claim that the convergence of shareholder payouts 
and the receipt of repatriated cash was a “mere coincidence” due to the 
tremendous leeway afforded to MNCs in the HIA.82 
On October 11, 2011, the bipartisan83 Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations (PSI), a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, released the aptly-named 
report, “Repatriating Offshore Funds: 2004 Tax Windfall for Select 
Multinationals” (the PSI Report).84 The PSI initiated a review in 2009 that 
included a survey of twenty major MNCs, including the fifteen that 
repatriated the most in 2005.85 That review resulted in nine findings of 
fact, which are the focus of the PSI Report: 
(1) U.S. jobs were lost, rather than gained.86 Broad studies found no 
evidence that repatriated funds increased employment overall.87 The top 
fifteen repatriating MNCs reduced their overall U.S. workforce by 20,931 
                                                     
creating a total deduction of $265 billion.”). But see Dharmapala et al., supra note 59, at 754 
(“[R]epatriations increased from an average of $62 billion per year from 2000 to 2004 to $299 billion 
in 2005 under the tax holiday.”). 
 79. Dharmapala et al., supra note 59, at 782. 
 80. See I.R.S. Notice, supra note 69. 
 81. See DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40178, TAX 
CUTS ON REPATRIATION EARNINGS AS ECONOMIC STIMULUS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 8 (2011) 
(“Note that because of the fungibility of money, firms that use part of the repatriation to repurchase 
shares may not violate the law.”); PSI Report, supra note 59, at 23 (“The fungibility of dollars and the 
law’s failure to require corporate records tracing the use of repatriated funds make it difficult to 
determine the extent to which repatriated dividends, or funds freed up by repatriated dividends, 
contributed to the increase in executive pay.”). 
 82. Postcards from a Tax Holiday, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/ 
11/12/opinion/postcards-from-a-tax-holiday.html. 
 83. At the time of the PSI Report, the PSI consisted of Carl Levin (D-MI) (as Chairman), Thomas 
Carper (D-DE), Mary Landrieu (D-LA), Claire McCaskill (D-MO), Jon Tester (D-MT), Mark Begich 
(D-AK), Tom Coburn (R-OK), Susan Collins (R-ME), Scott Brown (R-MA), John McCain (R-AZ), 
and Rand Paul (R-KY). 
 84. PSI REPORT, supra note 59. 
 85. Id. at 3. 
 86. Id. at 4, 12–16. 
 87. Id. at 4; Dharmapala et al., supra note 59, at 769. 
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jobs after the AJCA holiday.88 The MNC that repatriated the most, $35.5 
billion, cut 11,748 jobs between 2004 and 2007.89 
(2) R&D expenditures did not accelerate.90 R&D spending in the top 
fifteen MNCs was consistent with its gradual increase prior to their 
repatriation of over $149 billion.91 Broader studies “concluded that there 
was no evidence that the 2004 AJCA repatriation led to increased R&D 
spending overall.”92 
(3) Stock repurchases increased after repatriation.93 Despite the IRS 
guidance forbidding repatriated funds being used for stock repurchases,94 
twelve of the top fifteen repatriating MNCs increased their stock 
repurchases from 2004 to 2009.95 The results of the PSI review found that 
stock repurchases decreased 10% from 2002 to 2003, then “increas[ed] 
13% from 2003 to 2004, 16% from 2004 to 2005, rising the most, 38%, 
from 2005 to 2006, and 9% from 2006 to 2007.”96 MNCs claimed that the 
convergence of stock repurchases and their repatriation of billions of 
dollars was a “mere coincidence.”97 Therefore, the PSI report shrugs this 
off as a “disturbing parallel.”98 
(4) Executive compensation increased after repatriation.99 Again, 
funds were barred from being used for executive compensation by the IRS 
guidance.100 Despite this, the top fifteen repatriating MNCs increased 
compensation for their top five executives the most after the MNCs 
repatriated offshore funds.101 The PSI Report found that executive 
compensation at those MNCs “decreased 9%, then increased 14% from 
2003 to 2004, increased 27% from 2004 to 2005, increased the most, 30%, 
from 2005 to 2006, and increased 2% from 2006 to 2007.”102 The MNCs 
                                                     
 88. PSI REPORT, supra note 59, at 4. 
 89. Id. at 13. 
 90. Id. at 4, 17–19. 
 91. Id. at 17. 
 92. Id. at 19; see also Blouin & Krull, supra note 67, at 1027; Dharmapala et al., supra note 59, 
at 769. 
 93. PSI REPORT, supra note 59, at 4, 20–23; Dharmapala et al., supra note 59, at 771. 
 94. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 69, § 6.04. 
 95. PSI REPORT, supra note 59, at 21. 
 96. Id. 
 97. N.Y. TIMES, supra note 82. 
 98. PSI REPORT, supra note 59, at 20 (“[S]ubsequent research has shown a disturbing parallel 
between an increase in repatriated funds and an increase in share buybacks at the repatriating 
corporation.”). 
 99. Id. at 4, 23–27. 
 100. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 69, § 6.02. 
 101. PSI REPORT, supra note 59, at 23. 
 102. Id. at 24. 
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were not found in violation for these empirical trends; the PSI Report calls 
them “troubling parallels.”103 
(5) Only a narrow sector of multinationals benefited.104 Just 843 of 
the roughly 9,700 MNCs with CFCs participated in the AJCA holiday.105 
Of the $312 billion qualifying funds, $157 billion were repatriated by 
MNCs in two industry sectors: pharmaceuticals and technology.106 
Pharmaceutical and medical manufacturing MNCs were only 3% of the 
843 participating MNCs, yet they claimed nearly one-third of the total 
amount repatriated.107 MNCs with substantial offshore cash holdings 
benefitted the most from the repatriation holiday; thus, small businesses 
have heavily criticized it as an unfair tax benefit for large MNCs while 
they pay their fair share.108 
(6) Most repatriated funds flowed from tax havens.109 Of nineteen 
MNCs surveyed, seven repatriated between 90% and 100% of funds from 
tax havens while five repatriated 70% to 89% of such funds.110 PepsiCo, 
Inc. repatriated roughly $7.5 billion, 91.1% of which flowed from a CFC 
in Bermuda that had one full-time employee.111 PepsiCo disclosed that 
“the Bermuda holding company held and managed funds generated by a 
network of its other international subsidiaries.”112 The MNCs that 
repatriated were those sitting on stockpiled cash overseas—not smaller 
corporations that actually required the cash for domestic use. 
(7) Offshore funds increased after the 2004 repatriation.113 MNCs 
that repatriated under the 2004 holiday have since grown their offshore 
funds at an even greater rate than before.114 It is suggested that one of the 
AJCA’s lasting effects was “the conditioning of firms to expect future such 
holidays and to arrange their affairs accordingly.”115 One study contends 
                                                     
 103. Id. at 23. 
 104. Id. at 4, 28–30. 
 105. Id. at 28. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. at 29–30; see also letter from Holly Sklar, Exec. Dir., Bus. for Shared Prosperity, to 
Senators and Representatives of Congress (June 6, 2011), http://businessforsharedprosperity.org/ 
content/letter-congress-no-tax-holiday-us-multinationals (“When powerful large U.S. corporations 
avoid their fair share of taxes, they undermine U.S. competitiveness, contribute to the national debt 
and shift more of the tax burden to domestic businesses, especially small businesses that create most 
of the new jobs.”). 
 109. PSI REPORT, supra note 59, at 5, 30–33. 
 110. Id. at 30–31. 
 111. Id. at 3132. 
 112. Id. at 32. 
 113. Id. at 5, 33–37. 
 114. Id. at 33; Lee A. Sheppard & Martin A. Sullivan, Multinationals Accumulate to Repatriate, 
TAX NOTES INT’L, Feb. 2, 2009, at 376. 
 115. Thomas J. Brennan, What Happens After a Holiday? Long-Term Effects of the Repatriation 
Provision of the AJCA, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 17 (2010). 
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that “the AJCA holiday may have been responsible for the long-term 
classification of an increased fraction of foreign earnings being labeled as 
permanently reinvested overseas and also for a long-term increase in the 
amount of earnings generation that firms carry out overseas rather than in 
the United States.”116 
 (8) More than $2 trillion in cash assets were held domestically by 
U.S. corporations in 2011.117 Proponents of the HIA argued that MNCs 
needed to repatriate offshore funds because they were financially 
constrained.118 Professor John Slemrod, former senior tax counsel for 
President Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisors, said the HIA’s 
proponents’ assertion “holds no water at all . . . [t]he fact that 
[corporations] have these cash hoards suggests that investment is not 
constrained by lack of cash.”119 
(9) The AJCA repatriation holiday was a failed tax policy.120 The PSI 
Report found that the 2004 repatriation holiday did not have its intended 
stimulus effect on the U.S. economy.121 The repatriation holiday “cost the 
U.S. Treasury an estimated net revenue loss of $3.3 billion over ten years, 
produced no appreciable increase in U.S. jobs or research investments, and 
led to U.S. corporations directing more funds offshore.”122 
Academics and politicians have widely accepted the PSI Report’s 
nine findings while conflicting studies are largely discredited.123 Many 
attempts to enact similar repatriation holidays or otherwise modify the 
repatriation tax scheme have failed because of the bipartisan rebuke of the 
2004 repatriation holiday’s effects. 
                                                     
 116. Id. 
 117. PSI REPORT, supra note 59, at 5, 37–38. 
 118. See id. at 37; Dharmapala et al., supra note 59, at 753. 
 119. Jesse Drucker, Dodging Repatriation Tax Lets U.S. Companies Bring Home Cash, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 28, 2010, 9:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-12-29/ 
dodging-repatriation-tax-lets-u-s-companies-bring-home-cash [https://perma.cc/HX7M-VFG5] 
(quoting Professor Slemrod). 
 120. PSI REPORT, supra note 59, at 5, 39–41. 
 121. Id. at 39. 
 122. Id. at 5. 
 123. See, e.g., Scott Dyreng & Robert Hills, Evidence that Corporate Repatriations Under the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 Benefited the Domestic Economy, DUKE U. FUQUA SCH. BUS. 
(May 29, 2017) (in which the authors find job growth in the geographic region immediately 
surrounding the headquarters of some repatriating MNCs); Allen Sinai, Macroeconomic Effects of 
Reducing the Effective Tax Rate on Repatriated Foreign Subsidiary Earnings in a Credit- and 
Liquidity-Constrained Environment, DECISIONS ECON. (Nov. 2008, revised Jan. 30, 2009), 
https://www.heartland.org/_template-assets/documents/publications/30322.pdf (in which the author 
used computer simulations, rather than actual economic data, to support his assertions). 
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III. SELECTED LEGISLATION PROPOSED BETWEEN THE AJCA AND THE 
TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 
After the failure of the HIA, Congress struck down every attempt at 
repatriation tax reform until the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. This 
section will consider three selected proposals: The Boxer–Ensign 
amendment to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the 
Partnership to Build America Act, and the border adjustment tax proposal. 
A. The Boxer–Ensign Amendment to the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), also called 
the Stimulus Legislation, was a response to the Great Recession of 2008.124 
Its purpose was to make “supplemental appropriations for job preservation 
and creation, infrastructure investment, energy efficiency and science, 
assistance to the unemployed, and State and local fiscal stabilization.”125 
President Obama signed the ARRA into law on February 17, 2009.126 
On February 3, 2009, only weeks before the bill was to become law, 
Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) proposed an amendment, on behalf of 
herself and Senator John Ensign (R-CA), to the ARRA (the Boxer–Ensign 
Amendment), which would “allow the deduction for dividends received 
from controlled foreign corporations for an additional year.”127 The 
Boxer–Ensign Amendment would substitute new dates for those codified 
in I.R.C. § 965 (the HIA).128 It further substituted language regarding what 
investments MNCs could use repatriated funds for: “(i) worker hiring and 
training, (ii) research and development, (iii) capital improvements, (iv) 
acquisitions of business entities for the purpose of retaining or creating 
jobs in the U.S., and (v) clean energy initiatives.”129 In response to the 
critiques of the 2004 holiday, the Boxer–Ensign Amendment required that 
an audit be performed on each repatriating MNC to ensure the repatriated 
funds were used appropriately.130 
                                                     
 124. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Michael Levy, American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ 
American-Recovery-and-Reinvestment-Act [https://perma.cc/55J6-FU68]. 
 125. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.111-5, 123 Stat. 115. 
 126. Levy, supra note 124. 
 127. 155 Cong. Rec. S1408 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2009) (the Boxer–Ensign Amendment appears on 
page S1408). 
 128. Id. (“substituting ‘January 1, 2010,’ for ‘the date of the enactment of [§ 965]’” and 
“substituting ‘June 30, 2009’ for ‘June 30, 2003’”). 
 129. Id. (see § (a)(2)(B)(i)-(v) of the Boxer–Ensign Amendment) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 130. See id. at S1408–09 (see § (a)(3) of the Boxer–Ensign Amendment). 
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The Boxer–Ensign Amendment was sold to Congress as a bipartisan 
approach to repatriation that could stimulate the economy after the Great 
Recession.131 Senator Boxer acknowledged that the 2004 repatriation 
holiday did not meet its goals; however, she argued that the audit of MNCs 
would adequately address the issue of the fungibility of cash that impeded 
the success of the HIA.132 
Although Senators Boxer and Ensign attempted to tighten the ropes 
of the HIA, the Boxer–Ensign Amendment was not included in the 
ARRA.133 It was rejected by a vote of forty-two YEAs to fifty-five NAYs 
on the day it was proposed.134 The votes show a party split despite the 
bipartisan nature of the bill: 79% of the YEAs were Republican votes and 
86% of the NAYs were Democrat votes.135 At the time of this vote, nine 
of the eleven senators that would later author the PSI Report were in 
office.136 Of those nine senators, seven voted NAY and two voted YEA.137 
B. The Partnership to Build America Act 
The Partnership to Build America Act (PBAA) was the brainchild of 
Congressman John Delaney (D-MD-6).138 He proposed the Partnership to 
Build America Act of 2013 on May 22, 2013 (PBAA 2013),139 and 
proposed identical bills in 2015 and 2017: The Partnership to Build 
America Act of 2015 (PBAA 2015)140 and The Partnership to Build 
America Act of 2017 (PBAA 2017).141 
                                                     
 131. Id. (Boxer argued, “We have a number of cosponsors, so this is truly a bipartisan 
amendment, and I think it is worthy of everyone’s consideration.”). 
 132. Id. at S1409 (“Now, what you are going to hear from some of my colleagues is that some 
of the companies did not live up to the spirit of the amendment. The spirit of the amendment was to 
bring the money home and invest it here at home in job-producing activity. It is true . . . I tell you what 
we do, we guarantee that there will be an audit of these companies. Now, I would say to any of my 
colleagues who oppose it, show another case where we pass a tax break and we require every company 
that takes advantage of it to get audited. As a matter of fact, I think it is a fantastic precedent to set 
around here . . . . We address the issue of fungibility. We require that foreign funds must be spent in 
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 133. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009: Roll Vote No. 36, 155 Cong. Rec. 
S1420 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2009). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. (Sen. Brown (R-MA) and Sen. Paul (R-KY) joined the Senate in 2010 and 2011, 
respectively.). 
 137. Id. (The two YEAs were from Senator Coburn (R-OK) and Senator McCain (R-AZ).). 
 138. See Information on the Partnership to Build America Act, CONGRESSMAN JOHN DELANEY, 
www.delaney.house.gov/infrastructure/information-on-congressman-delaneys-infrastructure-bill 
[https://perma.cc/92NB-5RNJ]. 
 139. Partnership to Build America Act of 2013, H.R. 2084, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 140. Partnership to Build America Act of 2015, H.R. 413, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 141. Partnership to Build America Act of 2017, H.R. 1669, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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All iterations of the PBAA attempted to establish a wholly owned 
government corporation: the American Infrastructure Fund (AIF).142 The 
AIF was to sell $50 billion of fifty-year infrastructure bonds to MNCs 
through a competitive bidding process.143 The MNCs investing in these 
bonds would be allowed a foreign earnings tax exclusion, which would be 
a multiple of their investment, for the purpose of repatriating money from 
their CFCs.144 The MNCs would be bidding on how low of a multiplier 
they would accept;145 in no case could the multiplier be greater than six.146 
The AIF would then leverage the $50 billion in bonds at a 15:1 ratio to 
provide up to $750 billion in loans or guarantees.147 
Under this scheme, if an MNC were to purchase $1 million in bonds 
with a multiplier of four, the MNC could then repatriate $4 million tax 
free. Unlike the HIA, the funds repatriated under the PBAA would not be 
subject to a domestic reinvestment plan; thus, a participating MNC could 
use its repatriated foreign income freely.148 
According to Congressman Delaney’s website, the AIF would 
“finance the rebuilding of our country’s transportation, energy, 
communications, water, and education infrastructure through the creation 
of an infrastructure fund using repatriated corporate earnings.”149 This 
infrastructure-funding-based-mechanism’s purpose was warranted by the 
American Society of Civil Engineer’s 2013 Report Card for America’s 
Infrastructure, which gave it a “D+ G.P.A.” and estimated that an 
investment of $3.6 trillion would be needed by 2020.150 
PBAA 2013 was quickly supported by both Democrats and 
Republicans in the House of Representatives.151 The media also reported 
positively on PBAA 2013; one editorial identified the attractiveness of the 
bill as follows: 
What makes [PBAA 2013] so appealing is that it hits two birds with 
one stone. The fund would be financed by borrowing money 
privately—allowing private companies to repatriate foreign profits 
                                                     
 142. See H.R. 1669; H.R. 413; H.R. 2084. 
 143. H.R. 1669 § (2)(d)(5); H.R. 413 § (2)(d)(5); H.R. 2084 § (2)(d)(5). 
 144. H.R. 1669 § (2)(d)(5); H.R. 413 § (2)(d)(5); H.R. 2084 § (2)(d)(5). 
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 147. Information on the Partnership to Build America Act, supra note 138. 
 148. See H.R. 1669; H.R. 413; H.R. 2084. 
 149. Information on the Partnership to Build America Act, supra note 138. 
 150. 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENG’RS, http:// 
2013.infrastructurereportcard.org/ [https://perma.cc/3SRP-YP69]. 
 151. COSPONSORS: H.R. 2084—113TH CONGRESS (2013–2014), www.congress.gov/bill/113th-
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Act+of+2013”%5D%7D [https://perma.cc/AB4G-JB3P] (This bill eventually had seventy-five 
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by purchasing $50 billion in 50-year bonds that will pay for the badly-
needed road, transit, water, sewer, energy and other 
projects . . . . Most in Congress understand that the nation has an 
enormous infrastructure backlog . . . and many probably also 
recognize that the billions of dollars in profits American-based 
multinational companies have parked off-shore pose a challenge, 
too.152 
It is no surprise that there was initial excitement about a bill that 
could, in theory, provide $750 billion in financing for U.S. infrastructure 
with zero federal appropriations. Senator Michael Bennet (D-CO) then 
proposed the Senate version of the bill (PBAA 2014) on January 16, 
2014.153 
PBAA 2014 was met with criticism despite the initial positive 
reaction to PBAA 2013. On February 10, 2014, not even a month after 
PBAA 2014 was proposed, the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) released a 
memo finding that PBAA 2014 would cost the government between $70 
billion and $100 billion in lost revenue and that using a direct 
appropriation of $50 billion would save the government money and avoid 
incentivizing MNCs’ tax-dodging behavior.154 A coalition of thirty-six 
organizations cited the EPI memo and the PSI Report in a letter to Senators 
urging them to reject PBAA 2014 because it would reward MNCs that 
kept profits offshore.155 
Every PBAA proposal has disappeared into various 
subcommittees.156 The most recent proposal, PBAA 2017, had twenty-
seven cosponsors in the House of Representatives; that is about one-third 
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the 2013 proposal amassed.157 Now, the implementation of a territorial tax 
system has ended Congressman Delaney’s vision of funding U.S. 
infrastructure with a repatriation tax holiday. 
C. The Border Adjustment Tax Proposal 
In January 2016, House Republicans, led by Ways and Means 
Committee Chairman Representative Kevin Brady (R-TX-8), formed the 
Tax Reform Task Force (TRTF).158 The TRTF’s goal was “to deliver a 
strategy to create jobs, grow the economy, and raise wages by reducing 
rates, removing special interest carve-outs, and making our broken tax 
code simpler and fairer.”159 The TRTF released a blueprint of their tax 
reform proposal on June 24, 2016, which summarized the legislation they 
were to formally propose to Congress.160 
The TRTF blueprint included a call for the replacement of the United 
States’ worldwide tax system with a territorial tax system.161 The TRTF 
blueprint would subject foreign earnings that had already accumulated 
offshore (about $2.6 trillion)162 to a reduced repatriation tax. Cash and 
cash-like equivalents would be subject to an 8.75% tax while other assets 
would be subject to a 3.5% tax.163 The TRTF blueprint claimed that MNCs 
would use their foreign earnings repatriated under this scheme “to create 
American Jobs and grow their U.S. operations.”164 That claim seems to run 
contrary to the results of the 2004 holiday, which offered a comparable 
repatriation tax rate but added restrictions to what the repatriated funds 
could be used for.165 
In addition to the territorial tax system, the TRTF blueprint called for 
the implementation of a border adjustment tax (BAT).166 The BAT would 
have changed the way corporations are taxed in the U.S. by replacing the 
tax scheme at the time, which subjected corporate income to a tax rate of 
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35%, with a destination-based-cash-flow tax, which would have imposed 
a tax rate of 20%.167 The BAT would have disallowed businesses from 
deducting the cost of purchases abroad or from imports.168 Further, the 
BAT would not have imposed any tax on business revenue attributable to 
sales abroad or to exports.169 Simply put, the BAT was to create a tax 
jurisdiction that followed the location of consumption rather than the 
location of production.170 
For an example of how the BAT would operate, consider a U.S. 
MNC that ships shoelaces to Mexico where they will be used to make 
shoes. The profits the MNC makes on the shoelaces it exports will not be 
subject to the 20% tax and the MNC may still deduct its costs related to 
the production of the shoelaces. However, if the MNC were to purchase 
shoelaces from Mexico for use in shoes made in the United States, the 20% 
tax rate would apply to the profits from the shoes (including the shoelaces) 
and the MNC could not deduct the cost of the shoelaces because of their 
foreign-based origin of production. 
The BAT would further align the U.S. tax system with the rest of the 
industrialized world; only seven of the thirty-five countries in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) do 
not have a border tax.171 Border adjustments are common and are 
considered natural components of most consumption-based tax systems.172 
They are already incorporated in the U.S. tax system through state-level 
retail sales tax regimes.173 
In addition to not subjecting MNCs’ foreign profits to a repatriation 
tax, the BAT would make many profit-shifting techniques used by MNCs 
impossible.174 In the United States, an MNC may import goods from its 
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CFC and deduct the cost against taxable income.175 If the CFC is in a low-
tax jurisdiction, it is incentivized to overprice the import it sells to its 
parents to maximize its deduction.176 Similarly, the same MNC would be 
incentivized to underprice goods it exports to its CFC to minimize its 
income.177 Both of these maneuvers reduce the MNC’s worldwide tax 
burden and lower the tax revenue the United States could otherwise 
collect.178 The BAT would have disallowed deductions from imports and 
make exports have no bearing on taxes; therefore, these profit-shifting 
transactions would have no effect on domestic tax liability.179 
At the time of the TRTF blueprint, the BAT had appreciable 
momentum, but its support subsided. A study by the Tax Foundation 
estimated that corporate tax revenue would fall by $1.2 trillion over the 
next decade if the TRTF blueprint was implemented.180 Those opposed to 
the BAT felt that it would give tax breaks to big corporations while 
working class Americans got tax hikes on everything they buy. This 
sentiment is understandable; it seems unfair that MNCs would receive a 
substantial tax break while prices for imported goods would increase.181 
The Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy released an analysis 
on two large corporate lobbying coalitions that focused on the BAT.182 The 
two coalitions are the pro-BAT American Made Coalition,183 which 
includes Boeing, General Electric, and Oracle, and the anti-BAT 
Americans for Affordable Products,184 which includes Costco, Nike, and 
Walmart.185 Interestingly, the companies in the pro-BAT group paid an 
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average effective tax rate of just 14.5%, while companies in the anti-BAT 
group paid an average effective tax rate of 30.6%.186 The author of the 
analysis notes, “What is surprising is that so many lawmakers in Congress 
are pushing a policy that would make our tax code more unfair by heaping 
even more tax breaks on profitable corporations that aren’t even paying 
half the federal statutory tax rate.”187 
The proposed BAT was dead within a year of the introduction of the 
TFTR blueprint.188 Without the support of President Trump and other 
Republican leaders, there was little chance that a tax reform plan that 
included the BAT would pass the Senate.189 Perhaps the omission of a 
BAT from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was one of the keys to its successful 
enactment. 
IV. THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 
On December 22, 2017, President Trump signed into law the most 
sweeping tax reform legislation in recent history: The Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act (TCJA).190 The bill was proposed by Representative Kevin Brady on 
November 2, 2017, less than two months before it was signed into law.191 
The TCJA was politically divisive; it passed the December 2nd Senate 
vote with fifty-one YEAs to forty-nine NAYs.192 Every YEA vote was that 
of a Republican senator.193 Of the forty-nine NAYs, forty-six were from 
Democrat senators, two were from Independent senators, and one was 
from Senator Bob Corker (R-TN).194 
The TCJA makes macro-level reforms to both individual and 
corporate taxation. With respect to corporate taxation, among other 
provisions the TJCA permanently reduced the corporate income tax rate 
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to 21%, replaced the worldwide taxation system with a territorial taxation 
system, and enacted base erosion rules.195 
A. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s Effect on Repatriation 
The TCJA added § 245A to the I.R.C., which reads as follows: “In 
General.—In the case of any dividend received from a specified 10-
percent owned foreign corporation by a domestic corporation which is a 
U.S. shareholder with respect to such foreign corporation, there shall be 
allowed as a deduction an amount equal to the foreign-source portion of 
such dividend.”196 
This section effectuates a territorial tax in the United States by 
allowing a domestic corporation (the MNC) to deduct the equivalent of 
dividends it receives from a 10% owned foreign corporation (the CFC).197 
The TCJA refers to this system as a “participation exemption system 
of taxation.”198 Participation exemptions are the provisions that create a 
territorial tax system; they allow companies to exclude or deduct income 
they receive from CFCs.199 A worldwide tax system may have some 
participation exemptions, but those exemptions would not exclude or 
deduct the entirety of domestic taxes on foreign income.200 A territorial 
system is created when participation exemptions allow for MNCs to 
exclude or deduct all or nearly all of their foreign income from their 
taxable base. 
Of course, billions of dollars in tax revenue are currently deferred on 
the trillions of dollars in profits stockpiled offshore.201 The TCJA does not 
retroactively apply to those deferred taxes.202 Rather, the TCJA amends 
I.R.C. § 965 to enact a deemed repatriation of those currently deferred 
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profits.203 Simply put, currently deferred foreign profits are mandatorily 
subjected to “a rate of 15.5 percent for cash and cash-equivalent profits 
and 8 percent for reinvested foreign earnings.”204 
Although the stockpiled cash is still subject to a tax, the TJCA made 
the rate MNCs would pay on this cash (previously 35% less tax credits and 
deductions) drop dramatically. Thus, large MNCs that had the ability to 
stockpile cash offshore and patiently wait for beneficial tax legislation 
were rewarded for avoiding taxes that other corporations, which lacked 
domestically available capital, were required to pay. 
The TCJA includes several anti-base erosion provisions. As the name 
suggests, these rules prevent domestic tax base erosion and profit-
shifting.205 It is important that base erosion rules do not overly burden 
legitimate foreign business operations; they should focus on “taxing 
passive or highly mobile foreign income which may represent profits that 
were actually earned in the United States.”206 
One such anti-base erosion measure is the inclusion of MNCs’ 
subsidiaries’ low-taxed foreign income in MNCs’ taxable bases.207 Under 
this provision, MNCs must include 50% of their foreign subsidiaries’ 
income above a “normal return” in their base.208 The TCJA does not define 
low-taxed foreign income, but does exclude some forms of income, such 
as Subpart F income.209 It does, however, allow for MNCs to use up to 
80% of their foreign tax credits related to the included income against their 
domestic tax liability.210 MNCs receiving dividends from high-tax 
jurisdictions will likely have enough credits to offset any tax on their 
foreign earnings; MNCs receiving dividends from low-tax jurisdictions 
may not.211 Thus, this provision may impose a tax on foreign income 
dividends from low-tax jurisdictions. 
Another anti-base erosion measure the TJCA enacts is the “inbound 
rule.”212 It effectively acts like an alternative minimum tax for MNCs that 
do business with foreign subsidiaries.213 The inbound rule requires that 
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MNCs calculate their taxes in two ways: (1) calculate taxes owed with the 
statutory 21% tax rate and deduct income from CFCs and (2) calculate 
taxes owed with a 10% tax rate but do not deduct income from CFCs.214 If 
the second calculation is greater than the first calculation, the inbound rule 
requires the MNCs pay the difference between the two calculations in 
additional taxes.215 
Setting its sights on corporate inversions and earnings stripping, the 
TJCA includes a limit on interest deductions a corporation parented by an 
MNC can claim.216 The parent corporation does not have to be domiciled 
in the United States for this provision to apply; it applies to subsidiaries 
and affiliates of MNCs domiciled elsewhere.217 This provision limits the 
deduction these corporations can claim to a portion of the total interest 
paid by the MNC, based on the share of the corporation’s income to that 
of the MNC’s total income.218 The Tax Foundation provides the following 
example: 
[A] U.S. subsidiary of a foreign [MNC] has $10 million of income 
within a group with a total income of $100 million. The subsidiary 
has $5 million in interest payments, but the group only has a total of 
$20 million in interest payments. In this case, the subsidiary would 
only be allowed to deduct $2 million in interest payments, 
(10/100)*20.219 
The ramifications of this massive policy shift are yet to be seen. 
Although this positions the U.S. tax regime to further discourage corporate 
inversions and earnings stripping, MNCs have and surely will find ways 
to continue these practices. 
B. Critique of a Territorial Tax System in the United States 
The United States’ decision to switch its international tax policy to 
that of a territorial system of taxation is not surprising. At the beginning 
of the twentieth century the worldwide system of taxation was popular: 
thirty-three countries used it.220 Now, thirty of the thirty-five OECD 
members offer some participation exemption for foreign income.221 
Many critics have reacted negatively to the implementation of a 
system of taxation wherein a U.S. MNC’s profits made in other countries 
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are not subject to a domestic tax. These critics tend to think of a territorial 
tax as loosening the collar of already suspect MNCs by allowing them to 
move investments and jobs to low-tax jurisdictions.222 
The actual impact a territorial system will have on the practices of 
MNCs is more complicated. Studies on this topic agree that switching to a 
territorial system will generally not have the detrimental effects these 
critics claim.223 This is not because the lower corporate tax rate and anti-
base erosion measures will persuade MNCs to keep money and jobs in the 
United States. Rather, it is because deficiencies in the worldwide system 
already allowed MNCs freedom to use foreign income while taxes were 
deferred. 
During the worldwide system, MNCs took advantage of techniques 
that allowed them to effectively use foreign income without repatriating 
it. One such technique was simply to use a consolidated financial 
statement to facilitate domestic loans from third parties.224 The worldwide 
system was so malleable that it allowed many MNCs to achieve tax results 
more favorable than those under a territorial system.225 
The techniques MNCs used to achieve favorable results under a 
worldwide system were not trade secrets.226 Although complex and costly, 
these methods were frequently used to exploit deficiencies in the 
worldwide system, allowing MNCs access to their foreign income without 
being subjected to the repatriation tax.227 
Many MNCs use a tax-aligned supply chain structure (TASC) to 
separate a company’s profits into components by business process.228 To 
put it another way, an MNC will concentrate the most profitable functions 
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of their business in low-tax jurisdictions.229 A TASC may have the 
research and development of intangible property occur in the United 
States, but the intangibles will migrate (through a complex and costly 
process) to a low-tax jurisdiction to create profits.230 Although the 
territorial tax system may cause the need for TASCs to be modified to 
minimize tax obligations, “[a] transition to a . . . participation exemption 
system is unlikely to dramatically impact a U.S. [MNC’s] TASC.”231 
A 2001 study attempts to predict how moving to a territorial tax 
system would affect U.S. MNCs’ incentives to invest in certain 
locations.232 The study comes to an interesting conclusion: “Overall we 
cannot make any firm prediction of how location behavior would change 
if the United States were to adopt a dividend exemption system. However, 
the analysis provides no consistent or definitive evidence that dividend 
exemption would induce a large outflow of investments to low-tax 
locations.”233 The lack of definitive evidence quells some worry, despite 
the uncertainty. 
The prior deficiencies that allowed MNCs to bend the rules of a 
worldwide system were not inherent; they could have been corrected by 
legislation that would not have changed the fundamental premises of U.S. 
international income taxation as the TCJA.234 A study of a “model” 
worldwide taxation resulted in a finding that it is “superior to a territorial 
system, on simplicity, efficiency, and equity grounds.”235 The issue was 
creating a worldwide tax system that could not be so easily abused by 
MNCs and survive political scrutiny. 
Although critics highlight potential consequences of a territorial tax 
system, they are speculative. MNCs have had the opportunity to move 
investments and jobs offshore while avoiding U.S. taxes on substantial 
portions of their worldwide income. Although the process for doing so 
may now be less complex and costly, anti-base erosion measures coupled 
with a significantly decreased domestic corporate income tax rate may 
help suppress these issues. 
Likewise, the idea that MNCs will use large amounts of repatriated 
funds for domestic investment and job creation is speculative. Permitting 
MNCs to repatriate foreign income with an offsetting deduction may not 
have a significant effect on the U.S. economy considering many MNCs 
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were able to effectively use their foreign income domestically prior to the 
territorial system. Also, as the fallout from the HIA evidences, MNCs 
bringing new cash into the country may simply result in stock dividends, 
redemptions, and repurchases and increased executive compensation. 
Finally, MNCs may not be incentivized to repatriate their money because, 
unlike the HIA, the offsetting deduction is permanent; thus, MNCs may 
choose to use their foreign income in other jurisdictions indefinitely. 
CONCLUSION 
The former worldwide system of taxation was broken: MNCs were 
reducing their U.S. income tax obligations by stockpiling foreign income 
in offshore tax havens and using quasi-legal techniques to access that 
foreign cash domestically. Congress set a dangerous precedent when it 
enacted a repatriation tax holiday in 2004. MNCs used their repatriated 
money for stock redemptions and buybacks and executive compensation 
rather than job creation and domestic investments. MNCs then began 
stockpiling money offshore at a higher rate than before in hopes of another 
windfall. 
Other repatriation proposals in Congress were shot down as the 
amount in tax havens grew. Some proposals, such as the border adjustment 
tax proposal and the Partnership to Build America Act, offered novel 
solutions to the repatriation problem. However, the lasting effect of the 
2004 holiday was to apprise Congress of legislation that would most 
benefit the worst corporate actors. Therefore, the repatriation problem 
remained in flux for several years. 
Congress’s answer was to completely change the way the United 
States approaches international taxation. With the passage of the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act, the United States will use a territorial system of taxation, 
which essentially removes any domestic taxes on an MNC’s foreign 
income. Although many fear that removing the domestic corporate income 
tax from MNCs’ foreign profits will incentivize large U.S. companies to 
move investments and jobs offshore, that fear is generally unfounded. 
Most literature suggests that the transition from a worldwide to a territorial 
system will have a negligible effect on the way that MNCs do business. In 
addition, anti-base erosion measures, a reduced corporate income tax, and 
an influx of MNCs’ foreign cash into the U.S. economy may help suppress 
the potentially adverse consequences of the transition. The effect on 
domestic employment is also an unknown; one may consider the negative 
effect the AJCA had on repatriating MNCs’ employment to foreshadow 
the results of the TCJA. Regardless, it will likely take decades to fully 
understand the lasting effects the territorial tax will have on MNCs’ 
offshore operations and the U.S. economy at large. But the unstable and 
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easily manipulated worldwide tax regime under which the U.S. tax policy 
previously resided was due for substantial change. 
 
